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Revolution is based on land.  
Land is the basis of all independence.  




Following emancipation, the freedmen began to seek out the highest expression of 
American conceptions of freedom: their own land. Because of the relationship between land and 
freedom, they focused their efforts on acquiring homesteads and farms that they could cultivate 
on their own terms. Southern landowners, however, quickly recognized that in order to recreate 
their antebellum social and economic positions, they would need a class of dependent laborers to 
maintain the plantation system which had been so immensely profitable for them before the war. 
In order to protect their own economic interests, they began to subvert the efforts of the 
freedmen to acquire economic independence. The insufficient response of northerners, the 
economic conditions of the South, the inadequacy of the Southern Homestead Act, and the 
persistent actions of southerners prevented the land reforms that the freed people and their allies 
desired and left most freedmen landless and dependent upon the class of people from whom they 
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In his “Message to Grassroots” speech in 1963, prominent radical black activist Malcolm 
X stressed the necessity for control of land in order to protect the rights and freedom of blacks in 
America.1 While his tone and his sentiments may have differed from civil rights leaders at the 
time, there was nothing novel about his assertion. He was echoing the feelings of the freedmen 
and the political leaders aligned with their cause from one hundred years prior, expressing the 
same desire for a landed revolution that they had hoped for during Reconstruction.  Following 
emancipation, the freedmen began to seek out the highest expression of American conceptions of 
freedom: their own land. Many northerners were sympathetic to the freedmen’s desires, but their 
support for the methods required to help freedmen acquire land varied. Southerners, by contrast, 
responded to the economic decimation of the South during the war by trying to recreate the 
antebellum plantation system that had deprived blacks of the fruits of own labor.  
  Accordingly, while racial attitudes and residual bitterness from the Civil War often 
guided the conduct of southerners toward the freedmen, it was economic considerations of the 
landed aristocracy that were at the heart of the efforts to reassert control over the them. Land 
reform during Reconstruction threatened to forever overturn the plantation system of the South; 
planters believed that if the freedmen were able to acquire productive land of their own, there 
would be no labor for plantations, and King Cotton would never return to anything resembling its 
former glory. Accordingly, planters sought to establish and protect a monopoly on the productive 
capacity of the South, the lands suitable for cotton production. The aristocracy was not alone in 
their opposition to black land ownership, however. Because of the status attached to land 
ownership and agricultural production, non-planters also tried in various ways to exclude the 
                                                 
1 Malcolm X, "Message to Grassroots" (speech, November 10, 1963), Teaching History http:// 
teachingamericanhistory.org /library/document /message-to-grassroots/. 
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freedmen from acquiring land. Collectively, southern whites, planters or otherwise, used 
intimidation, violence, artifice, and local and state legislation to prevent the freedmen from 
becoming freeholders.  
 For their part, the freedmen were cognizant of these efforts by white southerners and 
deliberately resistant to them. For the most part, however, southern blacks held agrarian values 
very similar to their white counterparts. They saw control of the soil as the ultimate protection of 
independence and autonomy. Some were happy, or would have been if they had acquired land, to 
engage in the same sort of subsistence farming as white yeomen, but many of them wanted to 
continue farming cotton, just on their own terms. Whatever their intent, they were frequently 
willing to go to great lengths, contend with numerous obstacles, and endure great personal 
sacrifices to acquire land. There were people, southern and northern alike, however, who 
recognized that fact and preyed upon the freedmen’s eagerness. The Freedmen’s Bureau 
attempted, where possible, to protect the freedmen and help them overcome the challenges 
required for them to become land owners, but the bureau simply did not have the resources and 
manpower necessary to provide all the protection and assistance the freedmen required. The 
combined result of all those obstacles, the lack of northern support, and the interference of 
southerners who wanted to keep a dependent laboring class was all the foundation necessary to 
undermine the economic independence of the freedmen for at least the following several 
decades.2  
                                                 
2 The freedmen suffered a great deal of abuse at the hands of the northerners and even the national 
government. For the most part, however, such abuses are not covered here as they are outside the scope of this 
essay. For some examples, see Patricia C. Click, Time Full of Trial: The Roanoke Island Freedmen's Colony, 1862-
1867 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 130-142; Willie Lee Rose, Rehearsal for 
Reconstruction: The Port Royal Experiment (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), 270-1; Claude F. Oubre, Forty 
Acres and a Mule: The Freedmen's Bureau and Black Land Ownership (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1978), 42-43.  
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Even before the war had ended, many freedmen had already tried, or had been granted an 
opportunity to try, to establish themselves as free, independent citizens of the Republic. As early 
as 1861, freedmen began to escape their former masters and flee to federal troops. After Gen. 
Benjamin Butler set the precedent to treat escaped slaves as contraband of war, which would 
soon be replicated in congressional legislation, contraband camps began to spring up all over the 
South in places where federal troops were present. In Louisiana, Butler set up a system whereby 
the freedmen were contracted to planters who agreed to pay them wages set by the government.3 
Northern industrialists and political leaders also set up freed labor colonies—in Port Royal and 
on Roanoke Island, for instance—that allowed freedmen to work under contract and to exercise 
limited control over the lands on which they had been previously held in bondage. Almost 
immediately, the freedmen began to demonstrate their desire to become land owners. The 
administrator of the Roanoke Colony, former army chaplain Horace James, observed that the 
freedmen are “animated by the prospect of a homestead of their own, and the little comforts of a 
freehold.”4  Believing that “all wage earners who worked hard enough would be able to become 
property owners, James added that “land was the freedmen’s strongest incentive to industry.”5 In 
Port Royal, Brig. Gen. Rufus Saxton and Rev. Mansfield French devised a plan to help freedmen 
preempt plots of confiscated land that the government, under the direction of President Abraham 
Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, was planning on auctioning.6 Freedmen were 
directed by General Saxton to go into the lands set for auction and stake out forty acre claims. 
                                                 
3 See William Cohen, At Freedom's Edge: Black Mobility and the Southern White Quest for Racial Control, 
1861-1915 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), 9-11.  
 
4 James quoted in Click, Time Full of Trial, 62. 
 
5 Ibid.  
 
6 Rose, Rehearsal for Reconstruction, 275-99. 
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Saxton hoped that in doing so, the government would not remove the freedmen who had claimed 
the land in order to go ahead with the auction, and that the lands would be granted to the 
freedmen at the preferred rate of $1.25 per acre.7 General Saxon and Reverend French’s 
preemption plan was unsuccessful, but the freedmen demonstrated a great eagerness in filing 
claims and putting small houses upon the lands they hoped to acquire.  
After the freedmen had demonstrated their own self-sufficiency in the various free labor 
experiments, many northern political and military leaders began to focus on helping them acquire 
land. In recognition of the fact that without land the freedmen would find themselves at the 
mercy of those planters from whom they had recently gained their independence, Radical 
Republicans in Congress passed a series of acts intended to confiscate property in the South and 
redistribute it to freedmen and other loyal southerners. The Second Confiscation Act in August 
1862 and the Abandoned and Captured Property Acts of March 1863 and July 1864 were 
intended to break up the “vast monopolies” of planters and give the freedmen “something to 
stand upon when asserting and maintaining their right to fair wages.”8 Then, in January 1865, 
Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman issued Special Field Order #15, which distributed the land in 
what came to be known as the “Sherman Reservation” to freedmen for their exclusive use and 
occupation. The reservation stretched from just south of Charleston, South Carolina, down the 
whole coast of Georgia, into Florida until just north of Jacksonville, and from the sea, including 
                                                 
7 Ibid. When the land was auctioned, it went for an average of $11 per acre.  
 
8 Samuel J. May, "Letter from Rev. Samuel J. May," National Anti-Slavery Standard (New York), May 26, 
1866; George W. Julian, "Selections: Speech of Hon. George W. Julian, of Indiana: Delivered in the House of 
Representatives, Washington, DC, March 18, 1864," National Anti-Slavery Standard (New York), April 9, 1864. 
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the Sea Islands, to thirty miles inland.9 The order stated that forty-acre parcels would be 
distributed to the heads of families and that the military would protect those families in their 
possession “until Congress shall regulate their title.”10  
When Andrew Johnson assumed the office of the presidency in April 1865, however, the 
legislative efforts of Radical Republicans were severely impeded. In addition to vetoing the 
reauthorization bill for the Freedmen’s Bureau that would have, ostensibly, secured the freedmen 
in their possession of the lands in the Sherman Reservation, President Johnson issued an 
Amnesty Proclamation in May 1865 that granted the “restoration of all rights of property, except 
as to slaves” to most former Confederates, provided that they take an oath of loyalty to the 
Union.11 There were thirteen classes of people excepted from automatic amnesty, but President 
Johnson, “evincing a marvelous generosity,” pardoned an average of one hundred people per 
day, eventually pardoning 13,500 of the 15,000 who had applied.”12  
Because the scope of his proclamation was not immediately clear, many freedmen were 
left in a state of uncertainty in the aftermath of the Civil War. Recognizing the troubling 
implications of the proclamation before it had been formerly issued, Henry Ward Beecher, 
prominent abolitionist and avid proponent of property distribution to former slaves, expressed his 
concern that for “political reasons, there may be an attempt to restore these plantations to the old 
                                                 
9 William Tecumseh Sherman, "Order by the Commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi," 
in The Wartime Genesis of Free Labor: The Lower South, ed. Ira Berlin, Thavolia Glymph, Steven F. Miller, Joseph 
P. Reidy, Leslie S. Rowland, and Julie Saville, vol. 3, series 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 339-
40. 
 
10 Ibid., 339. 
 
11 Andrew Johnson, "Amnesty Proclamation, 29 May 1865," in The Papers of Andrew Johnson, ed. Paul H. 
Bergeron, (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1989), 129.  
 
12 Rose, Rehearsal for Reconstruction, 350; Heather Cox Richardson, Death of Reconstruction: Race, 
Labor, and Politics in the Post-Civil War North, 1865-1901 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 16. 
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owners. . . . It is my hope and prayer,” he added, “that, among the first things that President 
Johnson will do, will be to take his iron pen and strike out, with utter annihilation, so much of the 
proclamation of amnesty as contemplates restoration of property to those who take the oath of 
allegiance.”13 This hope was not realized; a year after it had been issued and after most 
southerners had reclaimed their property, general reformer and abolitionist Rev. Samuel May 
complained that the proclamation left the freedmen “dangling—dependent on the self-interest of 
their former oppressors.”  He added that the “unhappy consequences of [Johnson’s] bad ‘policy’ 
[were] already appearing in the revival of the haughty spirit of the Southern Aristocracy.”14 
Johnson had given planters the support they needed to regain control over the southern economy: 
the land. In the spring of 1866, to contemporary observers, the hope of revolutionizing the 
plantation economy of the South to release the freedmen from dependence upon their former 
masters looked rather bleak.  
By summer 1866, the hope of the freedmen to acquire property rested almost entirely on 
the Southern Homestead Act. Maj. Gen. O. O. Howard, after running out of other options to help 
freedmen secure the land he believed so vital to their wellbeing, suggested to Rep. Thaddeus 
Stevens, Radical Republican leader from Pennsylvania, that public lands be set aside for the 
exclusive use of the freedmen.15 Working with William Fessenden, who headed the Joint 
Committee on Reconstruction, Congressman Stevens crafted the act, which was signed into law 
in June of 1866 by President Johnson.16 It stated that 46,398,544 acres of public lands in 
                                                 
13  Henry Ward Beecher, "Henry Ward Beecher's Visit to South," Liberator (Boston), May 26, 1865. 
 
14  May, “Letter from Rev.” 
 
15 For more on Howard and his dedication to the freedmen, see William S. McFeely, Yankee Stepfather: 
General O.O. Howard and the Freedmen (New York: Norton, 1994). 
 
16 Claude F. Oubre, Forty Acres and a Mule, 86-87; "The Southern Homestead Law," Christian Recorder 
(Philadelphia), August 4, 1866. 
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Arkansas, Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi would be made available for settlement, 
and that until January 1, 1867, those lands would be for the “exclusive use” of the “freedmen and 
loyal refugees.”17 According to an African American newspaper, the Christian Recorder, the 
value of “this opening” for the freedmen could not have been “overestimated.”18 Rep. Sidney 
Clarke of Kansas later proclaimed that it could not “be too often repeated or too deeply 
impressed upon the public mind” that “this homestead policy is one of the Republic's strongest 
safeguards.”19 But the inadequacies of northern support, the flaws in the law, and the actions of 
southern opponents to black property ownership meant that the Southern Homestead Act would 
not be enough to overturn the planation system that relied on the exploitation of black labor.  
Like Radical Republicans, northerners in general recognized that the freedmen’s interests 
would be best protected if they acquired land; however, many of those northerners were opposed 
to any distribution or assistance from the government to help them do so.20 Even before the 
passage of the Southern Homestead Act, according to preeminent Reconstruction historian Eric 
Foner, northerners believed “that the road to black landownership should lie through patient 
wage labor—while market values and responses were learned—rather than a sudden ‘gift of 
land.’”21 Even and ardent abolitionist, William Channing Gannett, who had organized a school 
                                                 
17 Ibid.  
 
18 "Southern Homestead Law.” 
 
19 Sidney Clarke, "Land Monopoly vs The People--Abuses of the Treaty-Making Power: Extract of a 
Speech of Hon. Sidney Clarke, of Kansas, in the House of Representatives, January, 1869," National Anti-Slavery 
Standard (New York), May 8, 1869. 
 
20 LaWanda Cox, "The Promise of Land for the Freedmen" (1958), in Freedom, Racism, & Reconstruction: 
Collected Writings of Lawanda Cox, ed. Donald G. Nieman (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1997). 
 
21 Eric Foner, Politics and Ideology in the Age of the Civil War (Oxford University Press, 1980), Kindle 
Edition, 111; See also LaWanda Cox, "Tenancy in the United States, 1865-1900: A Consideration of the Validity of 
the Agricultural Ladder Hypothesis," in Freedom, Racism, & Reconstruction: Collected Writings of Lawanda Cox, 
ed. Donald G. Nieman (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1997). 
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for the freedmen in the Port Royal experiment, “prayed” that the freedmen not acquire land “by 
gift.”22 Horace James, the administrator of the Roanoke Colony, believed that “all wage earners 
who worked hard enough would be able to become property owners.”23 These attitudes 
contributed to the half-hearted approach to helping the freedmen secure land immediately after 
the attempts to do so began. Similar northern attitudes later greatly impacted the efficacy of the 
Southern Homestead Act. The Christian Recorder opined that the act would allow many 
freedmen to “begin on [a] humble scale, but if they show[ed] the right disposition,” they would 
“soon” be on the “high road to independence and prosperity.”24 The act did provide the freedmen 
with land, but even with transportation to their homesteads, it would have taken far more than 
“manly self-reliance” for most of the freedmen to make good use of their property.25 
There were numerous obstacles, in addition to the resistance of southerners, in front of 
the freedmen who wanted to acquire land under the provisions of the act. The Freedmen’s 
Bureau had not received any appropriation from Congress, requiring it to be entirely self-
sufficient.26 Union men like Brig. Gen. Joseph Fullerton, who had conducted an inspection of the 
conditions of the South for President Johnson, thought that the bureau would only agitate the 
political situation in the South, which would be “injurious to the freedman.”27 President Johnson 
                                                 
22 W.C.G., 1 March, 1863, in Pearson, in Letters from Port Royal: Written at the Time of the Civil War, 
1862-1868, ed. Elizabeth Ware Pearson (Boston: W.B. Clark Company, 1906), Kindle Edition. 
 
23 Click, Time Full of Trial, 62. 
 
24 "Southern Homestead Law." 
 
25 New York Tribune, December 14, 1869, quoted in Cox, "Tenancy in the United States,” 4. 
 
26 Because of the lack of funding, General Howard had to rely on Union soldiers and officers, whose wages 
were paid by the military, to fill the ranks of the bureau. Other than those wages paid by the government to bureau 
agents, only activities that had specific apportionments, like the travel provisions for freedmen taking advantage of 
the Southern Homestead Act, received funding from Congress.  
 
27 Joseph S. Fullerton to Andrew Johnson, 9 February 1866, in Bergeron, Papers, 64. 
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apparently concurred and decided in April 1866 to veto another bill extending the existence of 
the Freedmen’s Bureau that included an appropriation of $11,745,000.28 In order to garner the 
support to pass the bill over Johnson’s veto, Radical Republicans had to revise it and pass a 
version that included no such appropriation. Because of the great responsibility of carrying out 
the provisions of the Southern Homestead Act—including surveying lands, processing 
applications, and helping the freedmen acquire transportation to their homesteads, as well as 
their general duties of protecting the freedmen in contracts and relations with plantation 
owners—the resources of the bureau were stretched far too thin for it to be efficient.  
The six-month period during which “disloyalists [could] not get a foothold,” ended in 
January of 1867; it came and went before most freedmen had been able to even begin the process 
to acquire land.29 In the first place, many freedmen were bound to contracts that were renewed 
yearly, did not expire until January, and were paid only upon completion. If they had left to 
acquire homesteads during the first six months of the act, they would have had to forfeit the 
wages, in the form of a portion of the crop, that they had earned until that point, and which they 
desperately needed. Even if those freedmen had been able to leave, however, it is unlikely that 
they would have acquired homesteads by January. The bureau simply did not have the manpower 
to assist them. As late as March of 1867, there was only one land office open in Arkansas, for 
example, despite the fact that there were allegedly 9,208,012 acres available for settlement in 
that state alone. Maj. Gen. E. O. C. Ord reported great difficulties processing the number of 
                                                 
28 Andrew Johnson, "Veto of the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, February 19, 1866," Teaching American History, 
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/veto-of-the-freedmens-bureau-bill/. 
 
29 "Southern Homestead Law." 
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claims “of so many freedmen” and requested that a second office be opened in Clarkville.30 The 
bureau’s ability to process homestead claims in other states was just as insufficient. According to 
Claude Oubre, the inadequacy of the land offices in Louisiana was particularly acute.31  
One freedman, A.W. Ross, wrote on behalf of himself and nearly “three hundred heads of 
families” to the bureau commissioner, General Howard, complaining that despite their eagerness 
to enter homesteads, neither the assistant commissioner for Mississippi nor the land officer there 
could provide them with information about how to acquire them.32 He indicated that the planters 
for whom they had been working were charging as much as $12 an acre for rent. He also 
informed General Howard that if the “laggard land officers” did not hurry, they would have to 
continue “paying all they [could] earn to the owners of the soil” and that the owners would 
“manage by hook or by crook to get all.”33 
Despite the persistent efforts of the freedmen and the insistence of many northerners, it 
was very difficult for many blacks to simply strike out on their own. As a class, they were 
generally too indigent to purchase the seeds and implements necessary to be able to cultivate the 
land. In order to “relocate, register, sustain themselves and establish a farm,” settlers might need 
as much as $600-$1,000, the equivalent of roughly $9,000-$15,000 in 2017.34 Many freedmen, 
however, had “left their masters with nothing but their persons,” and even if they would have 
                                                 
30 Brevt. Major General Edward O. C. Ord to Major General O. O. Howard, 15 March 1867, in Freedom: A 
Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861-1867, ed. René Hayden, Anthony E. Kaye, Kate Masur, Steven F. 
Miller, Susan E. O'Donovan, Leslie S. Rowland, and Stephen A. West (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2013), 940.  
 
31 Oubre, Forty Acres and a Mule, 109.  
 
32 A. W. Ross to Gen O. O. Howard, 6 Oct 1866, in Hayden et al., Freedom, 941. 
 
33 Ibid.  
 
34 Neil Canaday, Charles Reback, and Kristin Stowe, "Race and Local Knowledge New Evidence from the 
Southern Homestead Act," Review of Black Political Economy 42, no. 4 (2015): 406. 
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stayed, there was little likelihood of their having saved any significant amount of money from 
the low pay they received.35 In one case, a group of twenty families requested from the bureau 
transportation to Lake City, Florida, where they had filed for homesteads. Because, however, 
they were “almost entirely destitute of clothing or means to make themselves comfortable during 
their journey” and “without money or means to purchase the necessary stock implements or 
seed,” their application for transportation was denied.36 Another group of freedmen who had 
settled near Ft. Smith, Arkansas, found themselves on their land without any implements to 
cultivate it. General Howard, perhaps foreshadowing his role in the Freedmen’s Bank, was able 
to raise $1072.83 from northern investors to help those freedmen acquire supplies, but such aid 
was rare.37 
Freedmen were generally unable to acquire loans to overcome their deficiencies. The war 
had totally decimated the economy of the South. By the summer of 1865, “commercial banking 
[in the South] had almost ceased to exist.”38 Because the whole of the South needed capital to 
repair the economy, northern banks generally had to decide between loaning money to the 
freedmen and loaning money to planters, and almost invariably, “the planters won out.”39 The 
                                                 
35 Post Chaplain Francis Springer to Capt. Chas. Banzhof, 19 December 1866, in Hayden et al., Freedom, 
951. 
 
36 Capt. Geo. R. Walbridge to Col. C. C. Sibley, 18 February 1867, in Hayden et al., Freedom, 959 and 959 
editors’ note.  
 
37 Springer to Banzhof, 19 December 1866, in Hayden et al., Freedom, 951 and 951 editors’ note.  
 
38 Dan T. Carter, When the War Was Over: The Failure of Self-Reconstruction in the South, 1865-
1867 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985), 99; Roger L. Ransom, "Reconstructing 
Reconstruction: Options and Limitations to Federal Policies on Land Distribution in 1866-67," Civil War 
History 51, no. 4 (2005): 670.  
 
39 Ransom, "Reconstructing Reconstruction,” 671. For more on the lack of credit in the South, see Heather 
Cox Richardson, "A Marshall Plan for the South? The Failure of Republican and Democratic Ideology during 
Reconstruction," Civil War History 51, no. 4 (2005): 378-87.  
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one notable exception, the Freedmen’s Bank, was established specifically to meet the credit 
needs of those blacks who had taken advantage of the Southern Homestead Act, but who 
required money in order to “break up the soil, fence, build, or cultivate.”40 The bank, however, 
was plagued with problems, not the least of which was a huge embezzlement scandal that meant 
that freedmen lost both the option to take out loans and any savings they had deposited in the 
bank.41 Regarding the lack of funds available, Wendell Phillips, prominent abolitionist and 
proponent of property distribution to freedmen, pleaded in 1870 that the new farmer “must be 
aided from some quarter before he can enter on his new possessions.”42 Although he believed 
that “such a point needs no laboring,” northern leaders, and even other notorious abolitionists, 
were unwilling to push for measures in Congress to help the freedmen. Lacking these lines of 
credit, most freedmen were forced into the “form of peonage that would ensnare black farmers 
for years: the sharecropping system.”43  
Another problem with the homestead act that faced loyal whites and freedmen who 
wished to take advantage of its provisions was that the land offered was often of inferior 
quality.44 The acreage offered by the act seemed abundant, but a great deal of it was on mountain 
sides, in swamps, or was otherwise not arable. According to historian Michel Lanza, 
                                                 
40 Wendell Phillips, "The Negro's Claim," National Anti-Slavery Standard (New York), January 29, 1870. 
 
41 For more on the freedmen’s bank, see Carl R. Osthaus, Freedmen, Philanthropy, and Fraud: A History of 
the Freedman's Savings Bank (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976). 
 
42 Phillips, "The Negro's Claim"; for more on Wendell Phillips’s view of property distribution, see James 
Brewer Stewart, Wendell Phillips: Liberty's Hero (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998). 
 
43 Charlene Gilbert and Quinn Eli, Homecoming: The Story of African-American Farmers (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 2000), 21. 
 
44 For more on the quality of land available under the Southern Homestead Act, see Claude F. Oubre, 
"'Forty Acres and a Mule': Louisiana and the Southern Homestead Act," Louisiana History 17, no. 2 (April 1, 1976) 
143-57. 
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“Republican leaders paid scant attention to land quality.”45 They were largely unaware of the fact 
that the reason most of the public land available in the South was unclaimed was precisely 
because it was “greatly unfit for cultivation.”46 In addition, at the passage of the act, most of the 
available land had not been surveyed, and the land records were in total disarray. In recognition 
of the poor quality of the available land, Rep. William Lawrence pleaded to his fellow 
legislators, unconvincingly, that the land that had been granted to railroad companies in 1856 but 
that had still not been utilized should be made available to freedmen and landless whites.47 He 
opposed the Republican congressman from Tennessee, Samuel Arnell, who, having read aloud 
the total acreage made available by the act, intended to create the impression that there was an 
abundance of land already available. Rep. George Julian, perhaps the most ardent supporter of 
land reform in Congress and the chairman of the Committee on Public Lands, informed his 
colleagues that most of the lands were either barren or “so inaccessible to settlements as to be 
undesirable for present occupancy.”48 Of the millions of acres held by the government in 
Louisiana, for instance, the 900,000 acres held for the railroads were “of a superior quality, in the 
vicinity of streams, and in every way desirable for homesteads.” Outside of that grant, according 
to one report, “there were not one hundred thousand acres of government land fit for 
cultivation.”49 A land surveyor in Arkansas wrote to the assistant commissioner that “nearly all 
                                                 
45 Michael L. Lanza, Agrarianism and Reconstruction Politics: The Southern Homestead Act (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1990), 87. 
 
46 Ibid.  
 
47 William Lawrence, "Homesteads to Colored Citizens: Important Speech of Hon. William Lawrence of 
Ohio," National Anti-Slavery Standard (New York), February 15, 1868. 
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first class cotton lands were entered years ago” and that “intending emigrants would do well to 
keep this fact in view.”50 
 In order, therefore, for the freedmen to have effected any substantial reform in the 
agricultural system of the South, they would have needed a great deal of assistance that was 
simply not forthcoming. Many northern Republicans were likely more concerned over the added 
representation that southern states would get in Congress. In determining congressional 
apportionment, southern blacks, whose numbers were counted as three-fifths only of a person 
when they were enslaved, would now count as full citizens of their respective states regardless of 
whether they were given the right to vote. Republicans, accordingly, generally felt that the best 
way to protect the rights of the freedmen was to extend the franchise. In May of 1866, the anti-
slavery society believed that the “suffrage of the freeman” was the primary “defense[] necessary 
to secure” the freedmen’s “personal liberty.” 51 Unless freedmen were given the franchise, only 
southern whites would elect representatives to Congress, which would dismantle the Republican 
Congressional supermajority. Because the vote for black men was so important to the political 
fortunes of the Republican Party, it was natural that the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment was 
the object of so much Republican attention.  
The most astute political observers and those who were most concerned with the 
wellbeing of the freedmen, however, recognized that without land to protect their interests, 
suffrage was of little use to the freedmen or to the party. Rep. Sidney Clarke, fearful of the 
                                                 
50 W. W. Granger to Brvt. Major John Tyler, 30 October 1866, in Hayden et al., Freedom, 943. According 
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“landed monopoly” that would “build injustice and rapacity into the political system,” 
proclaimed that “whoever owns the land of a country . . . will in the end control its politics, and 
that suffrage was not enough” if Congress really wanted to improve the plight of former slaves.52 
He argued to his fellow representatives that the history of America had been “a broader and more 
liberal recognition of occupation and labor,” and that failing to provide homesteads for poor 
southerners, black and white, would be an incredible step backward. But despite the fact that, 
according to Wendell Phillips, “the whole nation recognize[d] the fitness and necessity of 
securing land to the negro,” Congress was unwilling to do anything more to help them acquire it. 
Northerners believed that if the freedman were to acquire land, he must do so of his own accord, 
and that like the hog, the freedmen should be left to “root or die.”53   
Many northern political leaders either failed to recognize or were disinterested in the fact 
that planters’ control of the cotton-producing lands of the South gave them a practical monopoly 
over labor. Without land of their own, freedmen had little choice but to hire themselves out to 
planters for whatever terms they were willing to offer. American political doctrine had long 
recognized the danger of such monopolies. Even President Johnson had acknowledged that in the 
U.S. there was “no room for favored classes or monopolies.”54 Perhaps because of his success in 
overcoming his own humble beginnings, however, he was unwilling to afford the freedmen what 
he believed were special protections.55 He also believed in the states’ rights doctrine, which 
meant to him that any solution for the land and labor issues must be resolved by the states, and 
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not the national government. Johnson apparently did not share the view that it was “a 
distinguishing mark of true statesmanship to guard as much as possible against the possibility of 
monopolies in regard to property”56  
Overturning the land monopoly, therefore, was a primary concern for those interested in 
the wellbeing of freedmen and in general economic reform in the South. Aaron Powell, editor of 
the National Anti-Slavery Standard, criticized the “shameful negligence of the government” in 
not granting the freedmen property, which allowed the “old supporters of slavery” to once again 
“monopolize the land in that region.”57  Without measures to secure land, according to Reverend 
May, it was “impossible to protect or essentially improve the condition of the Freedmen” and 
they would be left as “homeless, landless, political ciphers, at the mercy of those who have 
always oppressed them.”58   
The land monopoly did not affect only landless blacks in the South, however.59 The 
authors of the Southern Homestead Act recognized this fact when they made the homesteads, in 
eighty-acre parcels, available for freedmen and loyal whites alike for the first six months, and for 
any landless head of household afterward. John M. Langston—free-born black and dean of 
Howard University Law School, the first black law school in the country—bemoaned the 
“slavery in the case of the negro” as well as what he called “slavery in the case of the poor white 
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man.”60 He recognized that it was the economic arrangement of the South that was the source of 
so many ills, not just the racial control wielded over former slaves. According to northern 
journalist Sidney Andrews—who had toured the South for three months during the first year of 
Reconstruction—many poor whites misguidedly assisted planters in protecting the system where 
“the middle and lower classes have no ability to free themselves.”61 Congressman Julian 
proclaimed that the Civil War was a “landholders’ rebellion” as much as it was a “slaveholders’ 
rebellion,” and that “vast monopolies” had “made the few the virtual owners of the multitude, 
whether white or black.”62 Andrews, accordingly, declared that “any plan of reconstruction is 
wrong that tends to leave the [planter aristocracy] in power.”63 Because planters’ economic, and 
in turn political, power was based on their control of the soil, the only way to have overturned 
that power was for a much larger portion of southerners, black and white alike, to own land, 
especially land capable of raising cash crops like cotton. Planters likely recognized this fact as 
well. Even in 1860, before the war had begun, their southern Democratic congressional allies had 
opposed land reform. A previous Homestead Act had passed Congress in 1860, but it was vetoed 
by President James Buchanon. In the House vote on the act, nearly all the nays came from 
southern representatives, while nearly all the ayes came from the North.64 
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While freedmen generally sought to resist the power wielded over them by the planter 
land monopoly, economic opportunity through property ownership had, since the colonial period, 
been synonymous with American conceptions of liberty. When John Smith landed in the newly 
established Virginia Colony in 1607, he declared that “every man may be master and owner of 
his own labour and land.”65 By the 1860s, most Americans, especially those living in the agrarian 
society of the South, recognized the “autonomy associated with title to property.”66 Blacks were 
certainly no exception. They believed that, as Andrew Johnson expressed, “freedom means 
liberty to work and enjoy the fruit of your own toil.” 67 They recognized, however, that in the 
southern economy, only land could have provided that liberty.68 
Because of these views, freedmen, in spite of all the difficulties, were still, perhaps even 
naively, chiefly interested in acquiring land for themselves. In the 1865 meeting between 
General Sherman, Secretary of War Stanton, and a coalition of freedmen, Garrison Frazier, 
speaking on behalf of himself and the former slaves present, said that “freedom, as we 
understand it . . . is taking us from under the yoke of bondage and placing us where we can reap 
the fruit of our own labor” and “take care of ourselves.” 69 He added that “the way we can best 
take care of ourselves is to have land, and turn it and till it by our own labor,” so that “we can 
maintain ourselves and have something to spare.” Frazier and those he was representing were not 
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alone in their view of land. According to another former slave, Merrimon Howard, “only land” 
would enable that “poor class to enjoy the sweet boon of freedom.”70 Their most persistent 
northern allies, in recognition of the fact that the freedmen and their ancestors had “for 
generations, tilled those lands without compensation,” felt that the freedmen should be given 
land to compensate for “their sweat, their tears, and their blood.”71 Frazier and the freedmen for 
whom he was speaking, however, emphasized that they were more than willing to repay the 
government for any land that they were given.72 They simply wanted “to be placed on land until 
[they were] able to buy it and make it [their] own.” Ownership of property, for the freedmen, was 
not simply an expression of economic success, and it generally meant more to them than the 
“acquisitive individualism” of northern capitalists. For the freedmen who had been held most 
their lives in servitude to planters, the Promised Land was land itself.  
Many freedmen, especially those who had taken part in the free labor experiments or who 
settled in Sherman’s Reservation, expected that Congress would either confirm them in their 
possession of the lands upon which they had made improvements or grant them land in some 
other fashion. The existence of this expectation, many southerners believed, contributed 
significantly to the freedmen’s refusal to contract with their former owners.73 The abolitionist 
Col. James Beecher believed that the Freedmen’s Bureau, in its attempts to help the freedmen 
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acquire land, was excusing “them from labor” and foster[ing] a spirit of distrust of their late 
masters.74 According to historian Charlene Gilbert, “one persistent rumor” among the freedmen, 
“insisted that the federal government would make a general land distribution to blacks on 
Christmas day of 1865.”75 Because contracts were often for a year or more, many freedmen who 
believed this rumor probably did not want to be bound to contracts that they could not leave 
when and if such land became available. There were other, more relevant, circumstances, 
however, that likely made freedmen reluctant to accept contracts. The whole South was cash 
poor, including planters whose only wealth was the land, so their ability to pay wages in a timely 
manner was limited.76  
Freedmen responded to their new condition of freedom not, as many southerners 
believed, by simply waiting for the government to grant them land. They, like other Americans 
interested in acquiring property, simply looked for the opportunities that were most likely to 
provide them the ability to purchase it. Long contracts, low pay, the risk of not being 
compensated for their labor at all, and the potential for violence against them and their supporters 
hindered the freedmen in their endeavor to acquire property. They were also, according to a 
report from the Freedmen’s Bureau assistant commissioner for Kentucky and Tennessee, fearful 
of violence against them by former Confederate soldiers. For instance, the freedmen’s fear that, 
when the long-absent soldiers returned, the shackles would “once again . . . be fastened upon 
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their limbs,” led them to flee from plantations to military outposts.77 Because of the hostility that 
freedmen faced by those former Confederates, their fear persisted long after the conclusion of the 
war.  
For many white southerners, the freedmen’s reluctance to contract only confirmed the 
mistaken idea that had been used to justify slavery earlier: that blacks were unwilling to work 
without coercion. They believed, or at least it suited their economic ideas to believe, that “the 
negro is an impulsive being” who likes “ease & indolence.”78 One southerner, who obviously 
held a very low opinion of blacks, declared that “the general complaint is they won’t work.”79 In 
an interesting twist of irony, one Union army captain thought that the freedmen might simply be 
emulating those planters who had “the means of employing others to work for them” when they 
refused to work.80 Whites all over the South would frequently “boast . . . that they have never 
done an hour's work.”81 Freedom and property had, for many whites, meant that they would be 
generally free from labor, but there is no evidence to suggest that any significant number of 
freedmen shared this idea.82  
Concern for the freedmen’s refusal to work for their former masters contributed greatly to 
the measures that southern whites took to return blacks to plantation work, but the situations that 
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justified those measures were often of the southerners’ own doing. Sidney Andrews reported that 
it was “proclaimed everywhere that [the freedman] will not work, that he cannot take care of 
himself, that he is a nuisance to society, . . . and that he is sure to die in a few months.” He 
clarified, however, that “the great body of the people” were “doing all they well [could] to make 
these assertions true.”83 The freedmen’s general fear of mistreatment, underpayment, and abuse 
on plantations frequently made them reluctant to contract. Southerners simply would not tolerate 
the perceived idleness of freedmen, however, and plantation owners justified their coercion of 
black labor by asserting that it was necessary to get freedmen to provide for their own support.  
In spite of that justification, many freedmen were willing hire out to their former masters 
and other plantation owners when doing so would help them to acquire land and to provide for 
themselves. Although black southerners shared with their white counterparts the idolization of 
land ownership, they quickly and readily absorbed the free labor sentiments of the North. White 
southerners, by and large, could not understand why the freedmen refused to do their duty by 
working the land for whites. The freedmen, however, simply wanted to find the best 
opportunities for themselves, and they were willing to remain “on the same plantations whenever 
they [found] good employers.”84 They were in the process of becoming an independent, mobile 
labor force, constantly searching for the “better man or bargain.”85 Even when they faced 
enormous hardships, they often “proved . . . capable in taking care of themselves,” much to the 
chagrin of the planters who wanted them to remain dependent.86 In situations where they had, for 
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reasons of necessity, signed unfavorable contracts, they usually demanded better terms in 
subsequent years.87 In essence, they were becoming a self-interested class of laborers who, 
looking to better their fortunes, resolved to acquire land as the ultimate expression of their 
newfound economic independence, and they were willing to work under whatever terms they 
could find to help them move in that direction.   
For the most part, however, southerners were generally opposed to the efforts of the 
freedmen to acquire property and to exert this new independence. Plantation owners still 
lamented the loss of slave property due to emancipation and were set on, in the words of black 
historian W.E.B. Du Bois, putting the freedmen “to work at a wage approximating as nearly as 
possible slavery conditions. “88  To voice their concerns, an anonymous group of southerners 
calling themselves “black injions” sent a letter to two freedmen, which warned that, because the 
United States is a “white mans Country,” they “are bitterly opposed to negroes settieng up to 
farming for themselves.”89 While the language and spelling of the letter indicate that it was likely 
not written by men of means, there is substantial evidence to corroborate that a significant 
portion of southerners felt as the “injions” did. In a letter from a bureau assistant commissioner 
in Virginia to his superiors, he reported that “the whites do not generally approve of” the 
freedmen having purchased farm land.90 Army chaplain James Hawley reported that the planters 
in Mississippi frequently came to him with three basic problems: “how to control the negro, how 
                                                 
87 Capt. Sam W. Carpenter to BVT. Major W.R. Morse, 31 October 1866, in Hayden et al., Freedom, 945. 
 
88 W.E.B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America, First Free Press ed. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1998), 586. 
 
89 Black injions to John Abraham and William Perry, February 1867, in Hayden et al., Freedom, 965. Any 
inconsistencies or errors in spelling or grammar are maintained from the originals, both here and throughout this 
paper.   
 
90 Carpenter to Morse, 31 October 1866, in Hayden et al., Freedom, 945. 
 
 Hiser 24 
 
to make him work hard enough, and how to pay him with the least expense possible.”91 These 
planters refused to accept that the only enticement available to compel laborers to work for them 
was to offer them acceptable contractual terms.   
Freedmen chiefly interested in pursuing their own interests were a threat to the plantation 
economy that whites could not tolerate, and so many of them strove “diligently to discourage the 
freedmen from any earnest efforts to promote their own higher welfare.”92 Brig. Gen. Carl Shurz, 
who had been assigned by President Johnson to conduct a thorough investigation into the 
conditions in the South, asserted that “the opposition to the negro's controlling his own labor” 
and “working for his own benefit” was plainly evident.93 While the institution of slavery had 
been abandoned on paper, planters hoped to maintain the “subserviency” and “helplessness” that 
had characterized it.94 In order to recreate the antebellum social structure with themselves at the 
top, planters wanted their former slaves to “remain as they had always done,” bound to the land 
that created the planters’ wealth.95 In this way, plantations “became at least as much an 
authoritarian political institution as a business enterprise.”96  
Fearing their loss of control over the black population of the South, many planters began 
to look abroad for solutions to their labor problem. Looking at the examples of the West Indies 
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and Jamaica—where the plantation system had remained intact after emancipation, in 1834 and 
1838, respectively—southerners tried to import foreign labor sources in similar fashion. The 
first, most obvious pool of laborers were the Chinese who had replaced the slave population in 
the West Indies.97 According to one state senator in South Carolina, the “Chinese were active, 
hardy, and willing operatives, . . .  and no foreign labor will likely succeed so well as the 
Coolie.”98 The plantation owners who thought that the “Coolie system” could be replicated in the 
U.S. failed to recognize, however, that the West Indies had a near total “absence of unutilized 
land,” so those laborers had little alternative but to stay on their plantations.99 Most of the 
attempts to utilize Chinese labor took place in Louisiana, but the planters immediately 
recognized that their new workers would “never [agree to] go into debt to the proprietor” and, 
accordingly, they would leave “after the contract ha[d] expired,” or even before if they were 
mistreated or otherwise unsatisfied.100 Without a “lien on the laborer,” planters could not 
“compel [them] to remain,” and Chinese immigrants would, therefore, never become the sort of 
“‘controllable’ labor” that they desired.101  
Planters were not only interested in Chinese laborers, however. Some of them believed, 
mistakenly, that European immigrants—“the thrifty German, the versatile Italian, the sober 
Englishman, [and] the sturdy sons of Erin”—might be a sufficient replacement for black slave 
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laborers.102 To entice these immigrants, more than one hundred immigration companies were 
established in the South between 1865 and 1867.103 One planter in Louisiana, for example, 
declared that he “will import Germans, Swedes, or some other race” to replace the lost slave 
laborers. For all their reverence for land, planters failed to recognize that European immigrants 
might, like the black labor they were trying to replace, want to acquire land of their own. Many 
of these European immigrants arrived in the U.S. intent on working only long enough to 
purchase and acquire their own property, either in the U.S. or back in their home countries, after 
they were able to save enough money.104 Many European immigrants had left low paying 
agricultural jobs to find better paying work in American factories and were not interested in the 
strenuous work involved in cotton production for the meager pay, usually a small portion of the 
crop, that planters were willing to offer. Southerners’ justifications for their treatment of the 
black population of their states—that blacks would not work without compulsion—had warped 
their perception so greatly that they failed to recognize that no other class of people would be 
willing to do the work for which the freedmen were only demanding reasonable wages.  
Although their justifications were generally framed in terms of racial attitudes, many 
southern plantation owners were simply unable to conceive of a system of free labor where their 
workers were not coerced. One southern planter remarked to his northern associate that “all we 
want is that our Yankee rulers should give us the same privileges with regard to the control of 
labor which they themselves have.” 105 When he was told that in the North, workers were not 
obligated to sign yearly contracts and that there were no criminal penalties for leaving their 
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employment, he remarked, “How can you get work out of a man unless you compel him in some 
way?” The objection of planters, however, was that the compensation requested by the freedmen 
was enough for them to elevate their status and potentially compete as property owners. Their 
dissatisfaction with other labor sources suggests that their ideas were not based entirely on race. 
No class of people was willing to do the work that slaves had done previously for the pay that 
southerners were willing to offer, so planters were forced to turn back to the “comfortable 
catechisms of the pro-slavery argument” that they had used in maintaining their peculiar 
institution, that subservience to whites was the “proper estate of colored men.”106 Southerners 
believed that blacks were not adapted to self-management or to independence and were fit only 
for the “ruder tasks of the fields.”107 One Alabama judge exemplified this view when he 
reportedly declared that he did not believe in “this thing of free negro labor,” although he was at 
least willing to “give it a fair trial.”108 The trouble with this sort of trial, however, was that 
plantation owners would not accept a system that was not as “useful for the future as slave labor 
has been profitable in the past.”109 They had none of the wider, capitalist conception of 
prosperity that had guided the Industrial Revolution in the North.110 They were not interested in 
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an upwardly mobile class of independent laborers; they simply wanted a “useful and efficient 
peasantry.”111 
Accordingly, southern planters generally “responded to emancipation with the same 
stubborn resistance that marked other nineteenth-century landed classes”—landowners in Haiti 
and Jamaica for instance—“that were faced with the loss of control over their labor,” and they 
sought, in whatever ways possible, to keep their former slaves at work on their plantations.112 In 
the words of Chaplain Hawley, “The chief end of a planter is to have & keep negroes, & the next 
end is to blaspheme all interference with the management of them.”113 But doing either required 
many congruent efforts, the culmination of which was intended to ensure that slaves had no 
option but to rely on the remuneration offered, although not always paid, by their former masters. 
The most viable alternative to working on cotton plantations was for the freedmen to work their 
own land. Planters knew, accordingly, that if the freedmen were able to “become possessed of a 
small freehold,” they would become a “self-supporting nuisance,” and so they were determined 
to “throw all obstacles” in the way of that occurring.114 Another appealing option for freedmen 
was the development of alternative industry, which planters, as a class, frequently deliberately 
stifled. According to historian Dan Carter, any move away from the antebellum economic 
arrangement “would be taken grudgingly and reluctantly.”115 
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Because planters were, above all, concerned with making sure that they had the labor 
necessary to keep their plantations operating, sometimes the only way to ensure that was to offer 
what the freedmen, or the bureau negotiating on their behalf, considered fair compensation. The 
Liberator, the most well-regarded abolitionist newspaper in the country, reported in December of 
1865, perhaps a bit naively, that “many prominent planters . . . are of the opinion that the 
negroes, if property paid and well treated, will work under the new system.116 The article also 
alleged that the sharecropping system, which most planters used, ostensibly, because of their lack 
of capital, would give way to a cash-wages system in subsequent years as former slaves were 
able to command more from the healing economy. That assertion was equally misguided, 
however. The sharecropping system—in which planters agreed to give a portion of the cotton 
crop, less expenses, to the freedmen who cultivated their land—dominated the southern economy 
for decades after the war.117 Nevertheless, the expression of this sentiment indicated that at least 
some planters in the months immediately following emancipation were willing to offer 
acceptable wages or shares, or pay those dictated by the Freedmen’s Bureau. In one situation, the 
commander of a contraband camp in Natchez, Mississippi, having received word that a couple 
hundred former slaves were on their way, wrote to his superior for advice. He indicated that the 
planters whom the freed people had left had conceded their willingness to pay whatever wages 
the government mandated so long as their laborers would just return to “finish their crops.”118 
Their willingness to accept those terms, however, was short-lived. Almost immediately after the 
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war, planters and their allies began to devise all sorts of methods to regain control of the freed 
people’s labor.  
One common method of keeping the freedmen dependent upon white planters for 
employment was to limit their mobility. Historian Jay Mandle argues that these restrictions on 
mobility were the most important method by which the planters were able to bind freedmen to 
the sharecropping system, and that is why it persisted until the Great Migration away from the 
South in the twentieth century. According to the postwar southern observer General Schurz, the 
“cases in which negroes were kept on the plantations, either by ruse or violence, were frequent 
enough in South Carolina and Georgia to call forth from General Saxton a circular threatening 
planters who persisted in this practice with loss of their property.”119 Black Codes—a series of 
state and local laws intended to address the new legal status of blacks in the South, but which 
often contained draconian provisions devised to undermine the freedom of former slaves—
contained many restrictions on movement. The Mississippi laws, for instance, stipulated that if 
any “free negro, or mulatto” is found who has “quit the service of [their] employer . . . without 
good cause,” they can be carried back, at their own expense, to their “legal employer.”120 The 
laws do not specify what constitutes “good cause,” however, and it is reasonable to suspect that 
judges, from the upper echelon of southern society, would interpret those words in the narrowest 
sense possible, finding very few just causes for freedmen to have left their employers.  
The most prevalent legal mechanisms for restricting the mobility of the freed people were 
the vagrancy laws, passed as a part of the Black Codes, in several southern states. These laws 
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had various mechanisms to disallow any person—although the enforcement was usually directed 
only at blacks—to be homeless or unemployed. The Virginia Vagrancy Act, for instance, ordered 
that vagrants shall be arrested and “employed in labor for any term not exceeding three months 
. . . for the best wages that can be procured; to be applied . . . for the use of the vagrant or his 
family.” The effect of the act was that freed people were not able to refuse to work for wages 
they deemed too low. If they did not accept terms offered by planters in their communities, they 
would be sent by the courts to work for the planters under terms that were likely worse than 
those offered originally. If freedmen tried to flee from this employment arrangement, then the 
law ordered that they be “confined with ball and chain,” sent back to the plantation they had left, 
and forced to labor for one additional month without any pay.121 The social and professional 
relationships between judges, local law enforcers, and planters frequently meant that when a 
planter was unable to entice enough labor for his plantation, the courts could order any idle freed 
people to go there and work.   
The Freedmen’s Bureau and the military prevented the application of some of these laws, 
but their spirit remained long after the bureau had disbanded. An order by the commander of the 
Department of South Carolina on 1 January 1866 stated that any vagrant laws must apply to 
whites and blacks equally, and that they could not be applied to people who could demonstrate 
that they had attempted, “but ha[d] been unable, to acquire employment.”122 Some planters did 
not approve of the bureau’s actions in this regard, and made appeals indicating why such 
mobility restrictions were necessary. In a letter to the commander of the Department of the 
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South, a South Carolina planter asserted that “the free negro laborer,” like soldiers in the military 
must be “compelled to obey.”123 The only way he saw to do this was to implement a pass system 
modeled on those used by the army and the navy. He complained that if such restrictions could 
not be implemented, then free black labor could not be made profitable, and, accordingly, that it 
should “be made to yield its position to free white labor.” His suggestions indicated that he, like 
other members of his class, was simply unable to understand a capitalist, free labor economic 
system that did not have a dependent class of laborers.  
Because the legal restrictions on mobility were formally forbidden the bureau, many 
southerners resorted to extralegal methods to keep the freedmen from exercising their freedom to 
move around the country, which greatly diminished their ability to search for better employment 
opportunities. An anonymous broadside in Tennessee, which threatened any person white or 
black who did not “do their duty,” had a few stipulations intended to keep blacks bound to the 
land of their former owners or current employers. It stated that “no man shall squat negroes on 
his place unless they are under his employ,” that “negroes found in cabins to themselves shall 
suffer the penalty,” “and that running about late of nights shall be strictly dealt with.”124  
The Civil Rights Act, passed over President Johnson’s veto in April of 1866, prohibited 
the application of many of these restrictions to mobility and many other violations of the 
freedmen’s new rights. It also affirmed the Freedmen’s Bureau’s role in preventing them.125 
According to the act, blacks were granted essentially all the rights of freedom, except voting, as 
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whites. Blacks, similarly, could be subjected only to the same laws and punishments as were 
whites. Because of the bureau’s lack of funding, however, the presence of federal authorities in 
the South was sparse and inconsistent. As late as February 1866, for instance, many blacks were 
“still being held as [chattel] slaves despite all the bureau’s efforts to free and protect them.”126 
When the distribution of land under the homestead act was added to their duties, the bureau’s 
presence in the South was simply not enough to protect the freed people according to the 
provisions of the Civil Rights Act.127  
Until the Freedmen’s Bureau was disbanded in June of 1872 and federal troops were 
removed from the South entirely in 1877, many freed people in the areas under federal control 
paid little mind to the legal restrictions to their mobility. According to one observers, they often 
felt that an important demonstration of their freedom was frequently “changing their place of 
residence.”128 Many of these migrants were probably more interested in reuniting with family 
and seeking out new opportunities than in simply moving to demonstrate their freedom, but the 
effect was all the same. Many southerners took notice of and resented these movements, and they 
frequently attributed them to alleged slovenly characteristics of the freedmen.129 In some cases, 
plantation owners reacted violently when their laborers attempted to leave their plantations. 
Schulz observed one group of “several negroes who came into town with bullet and buckshot 
wounds in their bodies.”130 Apparently, the “reckless and restless characters of that region” 
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conspired to “keep the negroes where they belonged,” and the white townspeople opened fire on 
the freedmen when they fled.    
Some southerners, instead of preventing migration of the freedmen, encouraged it in 
order to take advantage of them. In order to acquire homesteads, many freedmen had to relocate 
to unfamiliar places. Some of them went to the locations of their homesteads but were unfamiliar 
with the surveyor markings to locate their plots. They frequently had to resort to paying 
someone, usually a local white, to help them ascertain this information. In other cases, they 
would successfully locate their homestead but some white person would come along and tell 
them that they were in the wrong location.131 According to Col. John T. Sprague, white men “are 
not disposed to give Freedmen the necessary information,” and “[w]here there is no open 
opposition, there seems to be a silent compact on this subject.”132 In some more egregious cases, 
some freedmen were “intentionally misguided.” Neighboring white people would advise them to 
settle on private lands, and after they had cultivated and improved the land, the owners would 
come along and force them to either “lose their improvements, or purchase [the land] at an 
exorbitant price.”133  
Other planters, in need of additional cheap labor, would promise freedmen employment 
to entice them to relocate but would decline to make any commitment or sign any contracts so 
that the freedmen would be desperate for whatever work was offered when they arrived. One 
group of planters in Alacua County, Florida, for instance, hired a recruiter to round up hands for 
their plantation with the promise to make contracts with them once they arrived. Upon their 
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arrival, however, the terms of the actual contracts were far less favorable than the recruiter had 
promised, and the freed people were forced to either accept the terms or pay for their return 
transportation.134 In another case, “upwards of four thousand freedmen” from all over Georgia 
and South Carolina had come to Jacksonville, Florida, under such promises of contract and with 
designs to “enter land.” 135 Many of them arrived to find no contracts and “believed themselves 
in a state of servitude” when they were locked up in “railroad yard like a herd of cattle.” When 
planters came along offering pay, room and board, these freedmen generally accepted whatever 
terms they were offered in order to improve their condition. The problem had become so acute 
that, despite the bureau’s practice to allow the freedmen to move around the country as they 
pleased when they had the means to do so, Colonel Sprague requested of General Howard that 
no freedmen be allowed to travel to Jacksonville unless they had signed contracts from local 
planters in their possession.136 
In one particularly terrible case, a colony of roughly 1200 freed people, including 
children, left South Carolina thinking that they were being transported to Jacksonville. They 
believed that they would be able to take advantage of nearby homesteads and hire out in order to 
earn enough money to buy the necessary materials to cultivate their own land. They were, 
instead, taken to New Smyrna, Florida, into the “wilderness where they found no shelter but 
palmetto trees, no prospects but hard labor, no certainties but hardships and privations, no 
homesteads surveyed and ready for them, no town or inhabitants from whom to expect 
assistance, and no source from which to receive their daily sustenance for which they [were] 
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already anxious and stinted.”137 The Freedmen’s Bureau sent a special agent, W. J. Purnam, to 
investigate what had happened; he concluded that because the land was so poor and access to 
work so terrible, the whole endeavor was “a scheme either so blind or heartless that no ordinary 
judgment or conscious could conceive and execute it.”138 Purnam became convinced that a 
Union general, Ralph Ely, had deceived the freed people. The bureau, at the time, regularly 
provided transportation and one month of rations to families entering homesteads. The colony at 
New Smyrna had received only a portion of their rations, and General Ely had seemingly traded 
off the rest to a local merchant. He also collected $10 filing fees for the homesteads promised to 
each of the families but never entered their claims. By the time of Purnam’s investigation, nearly 
one thousand of the colonists had left with planters who arrived offering contracts, likely with 
terms that the freedmen might have otherwise rejected.139 As this situation illustrates, greed 
prompted many people, northern and southern alike, to take advantage of the desperate situation 
of the freedmen and of their eagerness to acquire land. Perhaps they were able to excuse this 
poor treatment because of the perceived racial inferiority and inhumanity of their victims, but 
their primary motivation was financial gain. Planters, when they had not devised such tricks 
themselves, were quick to capitalize on the resultant vulnerability of the freedmen in order to 
acquire labor.  
While such tricks often provided labor in certain situations or particular localities, 
southerners generally sought more consistent methods for maintaining and controlling the labor 
supply. One such method was professional restrictions that barred freed people from taking 
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nonagricultural work to maximize the labor supply for plantations. Part of the Black Codes in 
South Carolina, for instance, ordered that “no person of color” shall work in any profession 
except servant or farm hand without first obtaining a license from a local judge. The judge would 
examine the applicant’s “fitness, skill, [and] moral character,” before issuing such a license, the 
fees for which range from $10 to $100 per year.140 In addition to the fact that the costs were 
prohibitive, the vagueness and application of this law, like with many other Black Codes, likely 
meant wide latitude in making such determinations. An order by the commander of the 
Department of South Carolina subsequently forbade these license requirements, but were it not 
for the bureau’s presence in the state, South Carolina lawmakers would have used many 
restrictions just like these to protect their control over black labor, even during the period of 
federal Reconstruction.141  
In addition to the restrictions on the types of labor in which blacks were allowed by 
southerners to engage, there were also restrictions that defined for whom they were allowed to 
work. The natural order according to southerners, landed and otherwise, rich or poor, was white 
over black. For the under-classes, it may well have been race that guided their views, along with 
a desire to maintain some semblance of superiority in the “rigid spirit of caste” that defined 
southern society.142 For planters, however, the restrictions were far more practical; disallowing 
blacks to hire blacks minimized potential competition for the labor supply. B.T. Montgomery, a 
freedman who had leased Joseph Davis’s plantation, put out a newspaper advertisement in 
                                                 
140 Acts of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina Passed at the Sessions of 1864-1865 
(Columbia: Julian A. Shelby, 1866), 299. 
141 Sickles, “General Order,” in Hayden et al., Freedom, 82.  
 
142 In his report, Schurz stated that “another most singular notion still holds a potent sway over the minds of 
the masses—it is, that the elevation of the blacks will be the degradation of the whites.” Schurz, Report, 28; 
Andrews, “Among the Reconstructionists.”  
 
 Hiser 38 
 
November 1866 offering good wages to freedmen willing to work for him as laborers.143 No 
doubt this sort of activity enflamed local planters who were competing for those laborers but 
were disinterested in offering competitive pay. According to Schurz’s report, “The white citizens 
and authorities say that it is for their interests to drive out all independent negroes.”144 Any 
encroachment into the labor markets by freedmen threatened to weaken the dependence upon 
white owners that was necessary for maintaining the plantation system that southerners desired.  
Such restrictions did not apply only to male laborers, either. One of the stipulations on 
the anonymous broadside in Tennessee was that “negro women shall be employed by white 
persons.” A freedwoman in Florida, Martha Richardson, was dissatisfied with her employer and 
decided to leave. Because of the vagrancy laws in Florida that required all colored persons to be 
employed, she immediately sought work, which she found with her uncle Sandy Richardson. She 
began working as a nurse for Sandy’s children and had already been paid $5 for her first month 
when her former employer filed a complaint of vagrancy against her. Local authorities arrested 
and fined Martha for leaving her employer, rejecting her assertion that her uncle had given her a 
job, despite record of her payment. Sandy was arrested as well, for trying to prevent those 
authorities from apprehending his niece.145 The whole legal and social system of the South was 
being restructured to recreate, as near as possible, the antebellum arrangement. Martha 
Richardson was bound to her white employer in a system of peonage nearly the same as she 
would have been under slavery, but by a newly devised set of legal mechanisms.  
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The scope of Black Codes affected not only adults, but children as well. According to the 
laws of South Carolina, black children who had no parents or whose parents were “vagrants” 
could be ordered into apprenticeship contracts with any “respectable white person or colored 
person.”146 Children could be held in indentured servitude until they were twenty-one-years old 
if male, or eighteen if female. Parents of black children could bind their children in 
apprenticeships to respectable persons as well. The inclusion of the respectable qualification, 
however, was likely a deliberate method of excluding black people from taking such apprentices. 
Probably very few, if any, black people were regarded as respectable by the legal apparatus in 
South Carolina.  
  Planters did not rely on legal restrictions only to bind and keep their laborers at work on 
their plantations, however. They frequently used the contract system itself to try to restrain freed 
people in their employ.  Chaplain Hawley reported that some planters attempted to bind their 
potential hands with excessively long contracts. One man in particular offered “rations, clothing, 
medical care, and one-tenth of the crop if they contracted for ten years.”147  The nature of such an 
agreement, if the freedmen were held to their contracts by legal force—which they frequently 
were—was akin to indentured servitude, only a small improvement from the condition of the 
chattel slavery of the past.148 If planters held the power to sell or trade such a contract, the two 
would have been nearly indistinguishable.  
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Another way that plantation owners were able to bind blacks to their plantations was 
through debt peonage. Freedmen would enter into contracts that stipulated that they would be 
compensated for a portion of the crop less expenses. At the end of the year when the dues were 
totaled, planters would allege that the freedmen were actually in arrears, that the cost of rent, 
food, and supplies exceeded what they were due for their portion of the crop. Planters would then 
forbid the freedmen from leaving until the debt was paid, thus binding them over to work the 
subsequent year. In order for this scheme to work, planters would often approach local merchants 
from whom freedmen acquired supplies and request that the merchants inflate the costs of those 
goods on paper. They would generally offer to split the profit from defrauding the freedmen with 
merchants who agreed to do so. Special Agent Purnam reportedly spoke with one merchant who 
had refused several such offers from planters, whose “motto was ‘cheat ‘em.’”149 When they 
failed to find cooperative merchants, or when they realized how lucrative it was to both employ 
freedmen and sell them all their goods, many planters eventually became the merchants 
themselves.150 The Peonage Abolition Act of 1867 formally forbade the practice of using debt to 
bind laborers, but that law, like the Civil Rights Act, depended upon the overextended bureau for 
enforcement.151  
Planters were well aware of the capital investments necessary to cultivate a cotton crop, 
so in addition to generally paying so little that freedmen would never be able to save for such 
investments, they frequently withheld black laborers’ shares beyond when the cotton had sold to 
prevent them from leaving to find better opportunities. In November of 1866, Kelly Moses, a 
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freedmen from Bishopville, South Carolina, wrote to the Freedmen’s Bureau assistant 
commissioner for the state to file a complaint. He complained that “the White men all meet 
togather in Bishopville and agree to not pay the freedmen no cotton money until January” so that 
they could hold them over for the next year.152 Most contracts for laborers were entered in 
January of each year so that planters would know how much of their land they would be able to 
cultivate. When freedmen were unable to contract with a plantation owner by that time, their 
options for employment became exceedingly slim. The shares in Bishopville were so low, 
according to Moses, that if the freedmen and their children were forced to stay on at the 
plantations another year, “they will be starve[d] with Honger and with nakedness.”153  
Purnam reported in February of 1867 that these types of complaints for “nonpayment of 
wages [were] becoming numerous in Jackson County, Florida.”154  By withholding wages or 
payment for shares, the land owners were able to guarantee, without proper enticements, that the 
freed people working for them would have little choice but to remain where they were. The 
protection of the plantation system in the South required, first and foremost, that the options of 
the freed people be extremely limited. Although wages were probably withheld in some cases 
simply because the land holders, still recovering from the financial decimation of the war, had 
limited capital to compensate their workers, the primary reason for not paying in a timely manner 
was to bind the freed people where they were. Purnam reported additionally that “this failure to 
make payments is found mostly among the ‘best families,’ who were either too aristocratic to 
pay small debts, or act upon the principle that ‘ponderous bodies move slowly.’” Perhaps this 
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was true in some cases, but it seems far more likely that these families, like those in Bishopville, 
were aware that by withholding the wages of the freedmen, they could prevent them from 
seeking more gainful employment.  
Wages were not just temporarily withheld from the freedmen, however; plantation 
owners frequently, according to bureau regulations or otherwise, dismissed black laborers 
without pay. In spite of bureau regulations, planters who looked upon the requirement for written 
contracts as “interference with their private rights” attempted, through manipulation and artifice, 
to get freedmen to accept verbal agreements. These planters, when they were able, frequently 
took advantage of non-written contracts and modified the terms as they saw fit when it came 
time to compensate their workers.155 For example, a group of freedmen in Grenada, Mississippi, 
were afraid to contract in writing with their employer because they may have failed to 
understand the terms and would unwittingly sign themselves into servitude. After they accepted 
the terms of a verbal agreement—one-quarter of the crop plus sustenance—the planter decided to 
send them away without their share in the fall and hire a group of Irishmen to harvest the crop 
instead, and for much less than they were due, no doubt.156  
 In cases where freedmen refused to accept verbal contracts, or where the bureau advised 
them not to do so, planters often shirked the contracts in another way. According to Purnam, 
whites were frequently “disposed to take advantage of the ignorance of the Freedmen in regard 
to their contracts.” Some planters had “already tried to provoke the Freedmen and make them 
leave before the expiration of their contract in order to have an excuse for not paying them.”157 
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Southerners likely thought their ability to manipulate and take advantage of the freedmen was a 
natural result of the latter’s being unfit to manage their own affairs, but they would not admit that 
it was precisely the condition of servitude that had created their inexperience with contracts. By 
the 1870s, when freedmen were able to learn these lessons and make good use of them, the 
protections provided to them by the bureau were gone.  
  When limiting mobility, contract manipulations, and legal professional restrictions failed 
to keep blacks at work on plantations, southerners frequently turned to spreading fear though 
intimidation and brutality. Violence had always been a part of southern culture in a way that 
northerners had difficulty understanding.158 That is perhaps why they were so taken aback when 
Rep. Preston Brooks of South Carolina notoriously beat Sen. Charles Sumner of Massachusetts 
on the Senate floor in 1856 and returned to Congress. For northerners, it may have indicated a 
breakdown of rational debate and communication caused by the corrupting influence of slavery. 
For southerners, it was a normal and reasonable way for Brooks to defend the honor of his 
second cousin Sen. Andrew Butler, the state of South Carolina, and the South in general. So 
when examining the “reign of terror” against blacks who sought to upset the economic and social 
order of the South, there is no need to attribute those acts solely to the racist attitudes of the 
perpetrators.159 That is not to suggest that southern whites did not demean and dehumanize 
blacks solely for their race; they almost certainly did. But the reason that they turned to violence 
against the freedman who exerted his independence was, primarily, to protect the economic and 
political organization of the South.  
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 Carl Schurz explained in his report that “violence against black families who did own 
land and against white families who sold it to them was intended to strip blacks of both their land 
and their independence.”160 The authors of the anonymous broadside from Tennessee offered a 
hundred lashes or even a hanging to people who disobeyed its rules, one of which was, 
surprisingly, that “those that hire negroes must pay promptly and act with good faith to the 
negro.” They were not interested in racial terror for its own sake; they used the threat of violence 
against those who might upset the established social order of the South by not doing their “duty,” 
which included treating their black laborers “properly.”161  
 In February of 1866, a gang of white men in Bath County, Kentucky, attacked, viciously 
mutilated, and killed Jos. Balls, a free black man who was a “humble and inoffensive and much 
respected” member of his community.162 Although the attackers, who were discovered but 
released by local courts, never stated directly why they chose to attack such a man, it seems 
likely that it was connected to the fact that he was “the owner of forty acres of land.” Any sort of 
economic success or property ownership by blacks had the potential to result in violent reprisal 
from whites. Their acts, though gruesome, were simply another outward expression of the 
southern attempt to restore the antebellum order. In Old Town Hammock, Florida, a group of 
twenty-five to fifty local whites “banded together to prevent any freedmen from settling the 
land,” and in “unreconstructed area” of Campbellton, Florida, local white residents drove out 
Freedmen’s Bureau agents as they tried to enter.163 These incidents are just a few examples of 
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the many uses or threats of violence, which was an important social tool of southerners, to ensure 
that the freedmen never turned their emancipation into independence.   
 To minimize their ability to resist campaigns of violence by white southerners, black 
were frequently prevented from possessing weapons to defend themselves. The Black Codes in 
Alabama passed in 1865, for instance, forbade blacks from owning or carrying “firearms of other 
deadly weapons.”164 Local law enforcers frequently confiscated weapons from freedmen as well. 
The sheriff of Old Town Hammock, Florida, confiscated all firearms belonging to black 
residents of the town and of those blacks who were emigrating from elsewhere.165 Benjamin 
Truman, a journalist from Rhode Island reported that, during his time in the South, “pistols, old 
muskets, and shotguns were taken away from [the freedmen] as such weapons would be wrested 
from the hands of lunatics.”166 Given the prevalence of violence in the South during this period, 
confiscating weapons from freedmen put them at a clear disadvantage to their white southern 
counterparts.  
Foreshadowing the Jim Crow legislation that appeared after Reconstruction formally 
ended in 1877, local and state governments, often run by members or at least allies of the planter 
aristocracy, did their part to limit the economic opportunities of the freedmen. Their participation 
went beyond just the “petty, unjust, and discriminating” Black Codes that put restrictions on 
movement, vagrancy, employment, firearms, and even property ownership.167 When two of Jos. 
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Ball’s murderers were arrested by Freedmen’s Bureau agents, a Kentucky judge issued a writ of 
habeas corpus and ordered the men released. He argued that, because Kentucky had never 
seceded, the bureau had “no legal existence” there and thus no authority to arrest anyone.168 In 
another example, in late 1865, a bureau agent in Mississippi, after being verbally accosted by a 
white citizen for some time, ordered the citizen out of his office. When the man refused to go, he 
instructed two guards to remove him. The man subsequently went to the court and filed a charge 
of assault and battery against the agent, who was then arrested. 169 He was relatively quickly 
released from custody by federal authorities, but these instances reveal that the legal apparatus of 
the states, much like the white citizens themselves, recognized that bureau agents and federal 
troops were all that stood in the way of once again subjugating the black laborers of the South.  
Because of their animosity to anyone who might oppose their authority, southerners 
usually had an unfavorable disposition toward any Union soldier, current or former, black or 
white. In his inspection of twenty-three cases of the “most extreme cases of cruelty,” Special 
Inspector Bonested noted that twelve of them were against Union soldiers and three against the 
wives of Union soldiers.170 Considering that this violence had taken place in Kentucky, which 
had not seceded, it stands to reason that attitudes toward federal troops in the former Confederate 
states were even more hostile.  
Furthermore, at least some planters felt that “negro soldiers must be prevented from 
quartering with negro laborers.”  It was not just the physical presence of Union soldiers and 
government agents that southerners abhorred, but soldiers’ likely attitudes about standing up for 
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their own rights and asserting themselves. The “negro laborers” were expected to be docile, and 
interaction in close quarters with soldiers would, according to such planters, be a corrupting 
influence on them. However misguided, this view was born of the misconceptions that had 
protected the institution of slavery for so long. Contrary to southern beliefs, the freedmen knew 
when it was in their best interest to go along, but when they were given the opportunity to strike 
out on their own and pursue their own goals and interests, many of them were eager, with or 
without the influence of black soldiers.  
A great deal of the violence inflicted upon the freedmen came at the hands of the yeoman 
and the non-landowning white southerners, and not the planter class. Agricultural land was a 
symbol of economic freedom and a tool for political power, so blacks acquiring it were an 
affront to those white people who had very little or none of their own. Because this class of 
individuals had no large estates of their own which were in need of cultivation, and because they 
did not want blacks on equal footing in already crowded non-agricultural labor markets, they 
tended to chase blacks away rather than intimidate them into staying. In their letter to two 
freedmen in Kentucky, the “two black injions” warned that, even though they “do not wish to 
interfear with those that are att work for thare former masters,” they would no longer tolerate 
their presence, so they had “better get reddy to emigrate north of the ohio river prty soon, for go 
[they] must.”171 What the freedmen had done to push these men to disregard their wish to not 
interfere is unclear, but what is clear is their intent to drive the freedmen away. The black injions 
do say, however, that because “the young black Smith . . . is not a tiller of the soil,” he may 
remain “with his master if he will behave him self.” Their grievance, then, most likely had 
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something to do with possession of the soil, which the freedmen were either renting or perhaps 
making arrangements to buy from their former master.  
 The violence was just one of the many, sometimes inventive, ways that planters 
responded to the threat to their economic domination of the South. According to Dan Carter, “in 
important ways,” the actions of the planters “represented the most constructive and creative 
response white southerners were able to make to their defeat and to the revolution of 
emancipation.”172 The various forms of coercion used on black laborers allowed the planter 
aristocracy to create something that closely resembled the antebellum land monopoly in spite of 
the attempted interference of the Freedmen’s Bureau and the national government. Had the 
government been able to secure land for the freedmen, however, things might have turned out 
quite differently, and Malcolm X might not have, one hundred years later, declared that it was 
time for a new black land revolution in America.  
After President Johnson’s amnesty program was implemented, the Southern Homestead 
Act was the last and best hope for many freedmen of little means to acquire the property 
necessary to protect their independence. In 1878, two years after the act had been repealed, many 
of the sentiments and cries for land that had prompted it in the first place were still being 
expressed, although generally ignored.173 Blacks entered a total of 6,500 homestead claims, but 
only 1,000 of those resulted in the issuance of property certificates.174 By the time the act was 
repealed in 1876, fewer than 5 percent of the roughly four million freedmen living in the South 
had acquired their own land.175 Probably only a very small percentage of those had acquired 
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cotton-producing lands that would provide black laborers with economic alternatives to working 
for planters. Only three million of the forty-nine million acres originally offered by the 
homestead act had been claimed by freedmen. Accordingly, while that land was a great boon for 
those one thousand families with successful claims, it was insufficient to effect the land 
revolution that was necessary to protect the freedmen in the South as a class, and many of those 
in the most desperate need of homesteads were denied them. According to Michael Lanza, the 
Southern Homestead Act “provided nothing to those who had nothing,” and the other measures 
to help freedmen secure land provided even less.176 
The planters, for their part, enshrined the spirit, if not the effect, of the overturned Black 
Codes in the laws and public regulations that defined the Jim Crow era following 
Reconstruction. When the government ended the Freedmen’s Bureau in 1872 and removed the 
final federal troops as a part of the Compromise of 1877, planters had already devised the system 
they would use to capture the majority of the production value of the freedmen’s labor.177 Many 
of the fair arrangements and contracts and a great deal of the tolerable treatment that had been 
enforced only by the bureau’s presence faded after it was dissolved. What limited advancements 
toward economic independence the freed people had made during the early years of 
Reconstruction were quickly undermined by the renewed efforts of the planter aristocracy. 
Although the treatment of blacks in the South, especially after Reconstruction, was 
justified by racialist ideas, southern landed whites carried out the subjugation of black laborers 
for economic and political reasons as well. Because planters could not conceive of a system of 
free black labor—and because the other labor sources they had entreated to replace the freedmen 
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had failed to do so—they were intent on preventing the freedmen’s economic liberation that 
would come with property ownership. They set about in every way they could conceive to make 
sure that the freedmen were subservient to their economic and political will. The freedmen tried 
earnestly to resist these efforts by seeking out the best wages and acquiring homesteads, but 
because the homestead policy was fatally flawed, the freedmen were unable to resist the efforts 
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